Lack of liquidity: The Early warning signals by Garter, Laurence N. & Zolfo, Frank J.
University of Mississippi
eGrove
Touche Ross Publications Deloitte Collection
1977
Lack of liquidity: The Early warning signals
Laurence N. Garter
Frank J. Zolfo
Follow this and additional works at: https://egrove.olemiss.edu/dl_tr
Part of the Accounting Commons, and the Taxation Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Deloitte Collection at eGrove. It has been accepted for inclusion in Touche Ross
Publications by an authorized administrator of eGrove. For more information, please contact egrove@olemiss.edu.
Recommended Citation
Tempo, Vol. 23, no. 1 (1977), p. 49-51
LACK OF LIQUIDITY: 
THE EARLY WARNING SIGNALS 
by LAURENCE N. GARTER, Partner, New York and FRANK J. ZOLFO, Partner, New York 
In recent years, many companies have expanded at a 
mercurial rate, only to be hurled on the rocks by the rough 
seas of an economic climate. 
Many of these companies drag down not only them-
selves, but their stockholders and creditors, and affect even 
the financial institutions which support them. 
In most cases, the obvious cause of disaster is the 
company's loss of liquidity. The scenario in each case 
follows the same pattern. Operational problems cause an 
increase in current assets, which forces the need for 
increased debt. The financial institution reviews the 
financial statements and, based on traditional financial ratio 
analyses (tests of liquidity), furnishes the debt. Operational 
problems continue, current assets become no longer 
current, and the company defaults in debt payments. The 
financial institution again reviews the financial statements 
and determines that the company is no longer financially 
viable. There is a change in management, consultants are 
called in, turnaround plans are hurriedly prepared, and . . , 
the company fails. 
Over and over, the final scene is the same. The real 
problems surface too late to be solved. 
What are the early warning signs of a lack of liquidity? We 
suggest they are based on three premises: 
First, liquidity, in a real and pragmatic sense, can no 
longer be viewed as a series of historical financial ratios; it 
must be viewed in a "forward looking" perspective. 
Second, the traditional financial statement, viewed apart 
from operational analysis, is not an accurate and timely 
indicator of future viability. It merely reports the results of 
problems—too often after the problems have become too 
ingrained and difficult to correct. 
Third, proper management and operational reviews, 
combined with astute information analysis, can do much to 
avoid disaster. 
How To Define Liquidity 
A general purpose of the balance sheet—in addition to 
showing how the business has invested its money in various 
assets, and the sources of such funds—is to indicate 
probable liquidity. In this traditional context, liquidity 
refers to the convertibility of assets into cash and the ability 
to meet creditor obligations as they mature. 
The definition of liquidity, however, includes more than 
just the ability to convert assets into cash. We define 
liquidity as the ability: 
— To maintain effective management control 
— To sell the product in the future 
— To convert future sales into cash 
Sales to profits (P&L) 
Profit to cash (B/S) 
— To maintain the financial strength and credibility to ride 
out temporary problems that will occur. 
Thus defined, one cannot wait for the traditional annua! 
report to diagnose the financial health (liquidity) of the 
company. By the time such statements have indicated that a 
cancerous condition exists, the fatal disease can be too far 
advanced. Financial institutions as well as management, 
must rethink their traditional approach of measuring 
performance from only financial statement analyses. 
Mature companies should never find themselves in the 
midst of a liquidity problem. Enough options are available 
to provide management with the opportunity either to fix 
the problem in its early stages or, if necessary, to liquidate 
or sell all or part of the company before its market value 
decreases significantly. 
What safeguards are needed: 
— Timely, accurate management reporting to identify 
problems early. (This assumes more than a set of financial 
statements. Key non-financial operating data is a must.) 
— Astute management to respond to the warning signals 
revealed by proper management reporting, and to 
monitor progress against their plans, 
— Adequate financial strength to withstand non-growth. 
— Ongoing communication with financial institutions and 
suppliers, so that "they" can counsel management with 
the problems rather than be part of the problem. 
Why do some companies find themselves in irreversible 
hard times? Because some miss the early warning signs, and 
so fail to achieve a turnaround. While others correctly read 
the signals, but are frozen into inaction by the enormity of 
the problems. 
Still others react impulsively to the warning signals, 
slashing away at every expense. As a result, profitable and 
efficient programs are sacrificed, without identifying the 
real problems. Thus, a retailer who slashes payroll, merely 
buys time, because his real problem may be poor inventory 
control, poor site location, or a cash shortage stimulated by 
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marginal credit sales. In one specific instance, a manufac-
turer who ordered a payroll slash by fifteen percent across 
the board caused havocon his well-engineered production 
lines, leaving untouched excess costs in marketing. 
Many companies who survive depressed economic times 
unscathed are just lucky. But many others succeed because 
they insist on sound planning, and then measuring their 
performance against that plan. The company which fails to 
measure its performance against its operating and financial 
plans, may do well in a growth market, but it is vulnerable to 
any downturn. Companies that wait for the audit report to 
indicate how viable they are generally end up identifying 
their problems too late to resolve them. 
More important are the lessons to be learned from past 
experience. What can and should be done to avoid the 
" I l l iqu id Balance Sheet"? 
The lessons are simple: 
— Early warning is the first requirement for a successful 
turnaround. 
— Financial statements report symptoms, not causes. 
— Management and financial institutions must coordinate 
their efforts in order to maintain a company's credibility. 
There are three basic areas in which companies and their 
lenders can work together to try to assure l iquidity: 
— Management and operations review 
— Improved information analysis (early warning signals) 
— Non-crisis problem solving. 
Management and Operations Review 
A management and operations review can provide 
management and its creditors with an objective identifica-
t ion of a company's strengths and weaknesses. It helps 
focus more clearly on the critical performance indicators. It 
is in two phases: 1) a review of the business and its 
management and 2) potential problem identification. 
The thrust of the review is to assess the degree of 
management control in the enterprise. Effective control 
requires that an enterprise 1) have the structure and 
resources to identify potential sales, as well as product ion, 
financial, and marketplace problems, and 2) take positive 
action before potential problems become crisis problems 
in the financial statement. To evaluate control , one 
analyzes management's resources, organization structure, 
information f low, planning processes, and the market-
place in which the f i rm operates. 
Improved Information Analysis 
Periodic management and operations reviews are of 
l imited use wi thout an "early warning system" that wil l 
analyze potential problems. To identify such problems 
requires improved information analysis. Such analysis 
includes monitor ing trends, challenging performance, 
asking hard questions, and insisting on results. 
The financial community, as well as management, has 
been using ratios as a major analytical tool. But traditional 
balance sheet ratios and earning ratios, we have seen, serve 
only as a benchmark; they fall short as an effective means of 
monitor ing a company. 
In fact, not only does traditional financial statement 
analysis suffer from being untimely, it can also be 
misleading, analogous to " the calm before the storm." For 
example, adequate working capital might actually reflect 
some problems. The high inventories are the result of soft 
sales, not record product ion. High receivables are caused 
by customer dissatisfaction and poor quality, not heavy 
sales. Low payables are because of supplier C.O.D. 
requests, not ability to make payment. And adequate cash 
exists because very little of it is needed for future growth. 
The solution lies in analyzing performance trends that 
compare unfavorably with the past or with plan, and then 
creating a feedback mechanism to indicate the response, if 
any, management has made and the anticipated results. 
The fol lowing type of information should be analyzed, in 
addition to traditional financial ratio analysis: 
Ability to sell the product. 
Is the product needed? Wil l customers stockpile it? How 
long is its effective life? Who are the customers, their 
economic status, their location? Are raw materials avail-
able, and are suppliers reliable? How many unit sales are 
anticipated? What is the market share? Is there a backlog? 
Ability to convert sales to earnings. 
Can the plant's efficiency and productivity maintain gross 
margins? Can increased costs be passed through? Are 
expenses being control led, both planned and indirect? 
What is the breakeven volume? Are production levels and 
profits headed in the right direction? What are the labor 
and overhead, the ratio of direct to indirect labor? Are 
materials being used efficiently? Do current value account-
ing concepts accurately measure the quality of earnings? 
Ability to convert earnings to cash. 
In managing accounts receivable, what are the credit 
policies, the comparative age of outstanding accounts? 
How are inventories controlled? What is the turnover, 
particularly on finished goods, the production backlogs, 
the raw material shortages? How are accounts payable 
managed, the age of payments due? 
Whether additional analysis is required wil l depend on 
company circumstances. For example, if the management 
and operations review identifies productivity as a potential 
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problem, then information should be requested to 
compare a production output with labor costs. If the review 
reveals a weakness in sales and marketing management, 
pricing and sales mix should be analyzed. Sales per square 
foot help define the productivity of a multi-store retailer, 
but do not tell much about a steel mil l. 
The men who are engaged in running the Federal 
Reserve System were handed this act as a printed 
document . . . and told to open Federal Reserve 
Banks in 16 days; and from that time on, with a great 
war raging, we were expected to construct out of 
thin air something that had not existed for over 80 
years. And I am frank to say that we knew mightily 
little about it. 
—BENJAMIN STRONG 
The analyses compare year-to-year operating perfor-
mance with both prior years and current objectives. Any 
changes from the norm constitute the early warning signs 
which traditional approaches tend to overlook. 
Non-Crisis Problem Solving 
Conducting management and operations reviews and 
using early warning signals do not guarantee that problems 
wil l never arise. They do, however, provide the basis for 
more rational problem solving. 
Once some early warning signs are spotted, what action 
should be taken? 
Non-crisis problem solving involves a five-stage response 
that maintains the company's viability, consistent with its 
longer range objectives. 
• Stages 1 and 2 are planning steps which are, in effect, 
the management and operations review. 
First, assess the organization, control, and management 
resources, availability of performance data, and vital 
external factors, such as industry trends and vendor and 
customer relations. 
Second, focus on more detailed financial and manage-
ment information and operations analyses. Determine the 
l ikel ihood of correcting the situation, and what the general 
requirements are to do so. 
• Stages 3 and 4 are action steps. 
Third, analyze the profit centers and cost centers that 
obviously need to be improved. This can include organiza-
t ion, product line, pricing, and overhead analyses. 
Fourth, recommend management action that requires 
specific objectives and target dates. Often managers 
assume that once a problem is identif ied, the job is done. 
• Stage 5 measures results. 
Develop the tools needed to make the improvements 
occur; measure actual progress against the action plan. 
What factors wil l t ip the scales in the company's favor 
when implementing an early warning system? 
— The speed with which the condit ion is identif ied. 
— The perimeter of the problem. 
— Resources management needs to combat the problem. 
— Management's ability to make a hard decision—i.e., 
against a pet product line, or a non-productive in-law. 
— The degree of cooperation between management, 
financial institutions, vendors, and professional support 
(lawyers, accountants, consultants). 
The Final Message 
In the life cycle of every company, there will be recession, 
inflation, technological change, and irrational competi t ion. 
It is, therefore, inexcusable for a well-managed company or 
financial institution to be caught by surprise. 
We believe that the concepts discussed here are 
generally applicable to all organizations: manufacturers, 
retailers, service oriented concerns, hospitals, and munici-
palities. The approach is also well suited to the lender/ 
creditor relationship. 
The message we leave with management is that financial 
ratio analysis is an appropriate exercise for management 
but that it is not a substitute for an early warning system for 
identifying operational problems. No manager should be 
reluctant to go to his financial institution and seek insights 
into solving his problems. Indeed, enlightened manage-
ment not only should look to financial institutions to chal-
lenge performance, but also may interpret their silence as a 
sign that things are going wel l . 
The message to financial institutions is that a company 
with financial problems did not acquire them overnight. It 
has usually experienced one to three years of subsurface 
difficulty. The earlier these signs are identif ied and 
analyzed, the greater is the chance of effective corrective 
action. In brief, financial institutions should use the 
fol lowing as their guide: 
1. Insist that customers use early warning techniques, 
have periodic operations and management reviews. 
2. When in doubt about trends, ask hard questions and 
insist on results. 
3. If results do not occur quickly enough, do not hesitate 
to call for help f rom outside the company. & 
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